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SUMMARY 
 
The theoretical views and ideas offered in the following pages – which are 
quite long in order to offer a through explanation of the vast and diverse 
medical and anthropological literature we have available – regard specific 
concepts and paradigms that will be useful in order to create a solid 
framework for the ethnographic material we have gathered. 
 
For more than twenty years, within a medical-anthropological debate, 
the notions of the body, health, and disease have been the subject of 
a fundamental redefining process, freeing these notions of assump- 
tions regarding “natural” realities, while highlighting cultural, social 
and historical modalities that subtend their makeup. Ethnographic 
research, through the comparison of how the body, health, and dis- 
ease are represented in various groups, has shown just how variable 
corporeity – and the threshold that separates health and disease – is 
in different cultures. The concept of corporeity is defined by a funda- 
mental ambiguity: on one hand we have the experience of the body 
itself, while on the other there is the objectification of the biological 
body and how it is represented. 
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When making the distinction between experience and representation 
of the body, the subject of our anthropological and philosophical 
debate, we are unable to find a clear connection to real life. As a 
matter of fact, we find ourselves with a body to represent, and yet 
at the same time, these are the bodies through which we know the 
world around us. Such a dichotomy is a “pretence” that arises within 
a Cartesian philosophical-scientific system and the mind-body du- 
alism that has permeated Western science – a paradigm in which 
the human subject is conceived solely as a thinking being, while  
the body is simply a physical instrument, completely detached from 
thought. The distinction between res extensa (a physical substance 
that can be measured and divided) and res cogitans (heavy substance 
and as such cannot be measured or divided) is at the foundation of 
the aforesaid dualism that sees the body and mind at independent 
entities than are not conditioned by one another1. 
Beginning with Descartes, Western philosophical thinking regarding 
mankind has generally developed on a theoretical level and not on 
the basis of actual historical and social experience. Western science 
has welcomed the Cartesian dualism while denying those contradic- 
tions that oppose the philosophical theory rather than daily practice. 
Even anthropological thinking has long been dependent on this dual- 
istic conception, which gave rise to the process of multiple dichoto- 
mies, expressed through the contrast among “We”, the “spiritual” 
West, and “Them”, the “wild” and “material” Non-West. As a result, 
we find a clear break between the corporeal experience in “mental” 
and “Cartesian” Europe, with that of an experience an “exotic” and 
“psychosomatic” corporeality in which the Western separation had 
not yet been produced2. 
Since the thirties, the theme of the body has become the subject of 
studies in the field of humanities through the development of the 
concept of “Techniques of the Body” by Marcel Mauss, who defines 
this concept as follows: “The ways in which men, from society to 
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society, men know how to use their bodies”3. The body is mankind’s 
first tool, through which we interact within the fields of culture, so- 
ciety and history. Starting at this moment, in which the body exceeds 
its mere biomedical definition, anthropological studies address the 
ways in which social processes and cultural forms act on the body 
and therefore on the biological aspects of the human being. In this 
sense, technique is a form of learning that reflects the specific con- 
text in which it arose, becoming natural to the point of appearing as 
a practice belonging to biology rather than socio-cultural orders. 
If the body technique varies based on the contexts in which it devel- 
ops, it is therefore possible to investigate the nature of what Mauss 
defines as habitus4. With this concept, the author indicates all daily 
practices – such as sleeping, eating, talking, gesticulating etc. – that, 
while apparently “natural”, are actually culturally learned in ways 
that may not be based on verbal communication. In many cases, this 
can be “silent” learning5, absorbed by the body through observa- 
tion and imitation in ways that do not require an explanation. In this 
sense, the positioning of the body in the world – posture – are body 
techniques and the product of the cultural modelling that takes place 
as part of the relational experience, camouflaged processes that are 
triggered when we interact. 
The notion of habitus led to a recognition of the body as the result 
of an extensive social and cultural process, and contemporary an- 
thropological thinking, through the elaboration of the concept of em- 
bodiment, has made fundamental progress towards the deconstruc- 
tion of the scientific paradigm founded on the Cartesian dichotomy. 
This concept, which has become the central point, defines “the ways 
in which humans experience the body in the world and produce its 
representation” and refers to “the historical process of construction 
of the corporeity and bodily ways in history”6. This concept consid- 
ers the experience and representation of the body as inseparable: it is 
the body that experiences the world and, at the same time, produces 
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representations that arise from this understanding in the broadest 
sense of the cultural production of itself and the natural and social 
reality. The subject and the object of representation and experience 
are therefore inseparable – embodiment is, in this sense, the human 
condition, which appears mystified, due to the effect of naturaliza- 
tion that the body itself inevitably produces because it arises from 
the imagination of reality, therefore tending to be naturalized. 
The concept of embodiment in contemporary anthropology takes on 
the role of a methodological principle: Thomas Csordas, in an ar- 
ticle published in 1990, regards it as a paradigm for anthropology7. 
The embodiment theory has contributed to a major revamping of 
the discipline, taken on as the new theoretical perspective to be used 
to investigate cultural forms and the ways in which the Cartesian 
mind-body dichotomy is expressed. From the reinterpretation of the 
concept of embodiment developed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 
Pierre Bourdieu8, and through the analysis of specific ritual practices 
of the Christian charismatic movements, Csordas elaborates what he 
calls “cultural phenomenology”, in which the body takes the value 
of “subject” of the culture: 
 
The approach I will develop from the perspective of psychological anthro- 
pology leans strongly in the direction of phenomenology. This approach to 
embodiment begins from the methodological postulate that the body is not 
an object to be studied in relation to culture, but is to be considered as the 
subject of culture, or in other words as the existential ground of culture9. 
 
Therefore, the body is the starting point for the analysis of the cul- 
ture and the self. B By analyzing perception and practice (habitus), 
there is the collapse of the distinction between subject and object - it 
then becomes possible to investigate the experiences and representa- 
tions as constituting a continuous corporeality process. In this sense, 
historical, social and cultural processes are body products – namely 
cultural and natural – and the result is the embodiment of the exter- 
323  
Medical Anthropology 
 
 
nal actions and forces, as well as the objectification of our bodily 
experiences; “The body therefore becomes a product of history, and 
history can be viewed as a bodily process”10. The subject’s ability to 
act – and thus exercise power over others – passes through the body, 
through which power relations are expressed. 
Csordas’ analysis served as the basis for more recent studies on the 
concept of embodiment in medical anthropology, through which we 
began to look at the concepts of body, health and disease as a form 
of knowledge embodiment, based on the perception of historical, 
social, cultural and political realities. Anthropological work, which 
took on the basic principles of this phenomenological tradition, has 
had the merit of assaying biomedical classifications related to health 
and disease, revealing these as various cultural products, configured 
within corresponding frameworks of the mind/body dualism. For the 
French philosopher, the origin of everything is the body: a system in 
relationship with the world and that perceives the world. Perception 
does not lie in the external stimuli that the body would passively reg- 
ister; rather it is in the body and is indeterminate until it encounters 
an object. This is based on the idea that before the sentient body, there 
is no object, and nothing can be grasped objectively regardless of an 
operation of objectification-perceptual abstraction that is already cul- 
turally organized. A body in the world is abstracted and represented, 
gives meaning to the indeterminacy of the world by projecting its 
consciousness towards cultural interpretation of the surrounding real- 
ity. The body can only perform these operations in accordance with 
cultural values and manners, through which it aims its perception into 
the uncertainty – in itself meaningless – that surrounds it. The body 
as a subject of culture is agent at the same time acted upon, due to 
the fact that it is the object of cultural systems that guide perception. 
Bourdieu, determined to overcome the analysis of social systems, 
leads the reader towards a discussion that start with a concept of habi- 
tus11, for which Csordas offered the following definition: 
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A system of perjuring dispositions which is the unconscious, collectively 
inculcated principal for the generation and structuring of practices and 
representations12. 
 
A socially shaped body in every sense internalizes and embodies 
habitus. However, in addition to being culturally structured, the body 
in turn becomes a part of cultural structure – bodies that cultures pro- 
duce are the same bodies that live in the world producing culture, 
practicing it and recreating it in a subjective manner. Introjecting 
means turning knowhow and skills into something that is your own, 
up to assimilation – capacities that become productive. The process 
of embodiment of the experience is related to processes from the 
body and of the body, the processing of social life and cultural pro- 
duction. From the body as the subject, we see it as the active pro- 
ducer of knowledge, and the body in fact as a product of social, cul- 
tural and historical dynamics, regarding hegemonic practices rooted 
in everyone’s life and in the biographies of each and every one of 
us, receding from the sphere of awareness, moving towards unques- 
tioned common sense. The arbitrariness of social life from culture 
becomes nature, shaping corporeality and turning into hegemony. 
In this regard, the work of Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Margaret 
Lock is truly important. In an essay from 198713, the authors make 
a careful critique of the Cartesian dichotomy as “cultural model” to 
which they held that the same medical anthropology has long been 
subordinate. The task of medical anthropology is therefore that of 
revealing the historical and cultural nature of mind/body separation, 
which has managed to rise to a universal category by virtue of its 
“natural” definition. The body is in fact simultaneously natural and 
cultural, meaning that it is part of a specific historical context; there- 
fore we can define it as a “thinking body”14. Based on this phenom- 
enological interpretative perspective, we can reach the relationship 
between what the two scholars indicate as the “three bodies”: the in- 
325  
Medical Anthropology 
 
 
dividual body, the social body and the political body. The individual 
body is that which the person experiences, meaning “in the phenom- 
enological sense of body-self” as a set of its constituent parts (mind, 
matter, psyche, self). This was categorized in Western epistemology 
through the opposition of the individual and society, according to a 
concept of the self that is highly individualized, theorized as univer- 
sal, but which, however, is not accepted by many groups. 
Anthropological research has shown how well the Eurocentric 
conception of a unitary self, based on individuality, according to a 
Western philosophical tradition of where Descartes is considered one 
of the leaders, is not universal. The individual body must therefore be 
considered in relation to the social body, which refers to the means 
by which man thinks and represents nature, society and culture, and 
the political body, which refers to the powers and social forces that 
guard bodies, both individual and collective, in all areas related to 
reproduction, sexuality, work, health and disease. Mediation between 
the three dimensions of the body is through emotions, which repre- 
sent a bridge between the individual, society and the political body, as 
they imply at the same time feeling and cognitive guidelines, a public 
morality, as well as ideology. The model of the three bodies therefore 
helps expose the artificiality of Cartesian dualism, on which Western 
science and clinical medicine are founded, allowing for the pursuit of 
a sort of radically materialistic thinking tied to a mechanistic view of 
the body and its functions. 
The paradigm to which medical knowledge makes reference is built, 
in fact, based on biology – diseases reside in the physical body and 
they are biological and universal entities that transcend the social 
and cultural context. This “model” is defined by Byron Good: 
 
The dominant medical model employed in contemporary medical research 
and clinical practice is grounded an empiricist theory of language. Disea- 
ses are conceived as universal biological or psychophysiological entities, 
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resulting from somatic lesions or dysfunctions. Somatic or biochemical 
disorders produce experiences of distress and suffering that are communi- 
cated as complaints, and physiological and behavioural abnormalities that 
may be measured by clinical, laboratory or psychometric procedures15. 
 
Biomedicine does not take under its jurisdiction that which is not an 
objective pathological condition, however there is a contradiction in 
this practical work when this field bases much of its diagnosis on the 
narratives and experiences of the patient, their symptoms. Medical 
science has in this way made a distinction among the signs, objec- 
tive evidence of an illness amenable to direct or indirect observation, 
and symptoms or subjective evidence of a disease as perceived by 
the patient. From an anthropological point of view, the symptom is 
the narrative of an experience of suffering, rich in symbolism and 
socio-cultural references, because it was built by the patient starting 
from the embodiment of one’s life experience. In light of the concept 
of embodiment, the distinctive sign/symptom is the revival of the 
Cartesian dichotomy in the objective/subjective opposition. 
Medical anthropology claims, on the contrary, that the basis of the 
disease in the world’s cultural significance and negates the claim to 
quantify its nature through its testing of organismic reductionism of 
biomedicine. The notion of embodiment makes it possible to analyze 
the relationships between human suffering and social relationships 
and power: the body moves in a network of power relations that 
define healthy or ill, according undeniable authorities of medical 
science. Just think of the classifications produced by big powers – 
such as the State, the Church and biomedicine – which, claiming a 
unitary forms of physical identity, legitimized and even violent acts 
of persecution against those who are distanced by these aforesaid 
powers, therefore establishing the threshold between normality and 
abnormality. Exemplary in this regard are the cases of witchcraft or 
hysteria, in which the distance from that identity has been consid- 
ered a deviant, i.e. a mental disorder. State, Church and biomedi- 
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cine have thus taken an important role in the definition of normal 
and abnormal; with the common interest in controlling the female 
corporeality and with this the internal social body. The concepts of 
health and illness, quite far from being regarded as objective facts, 
now take on a different meaning when viewed from the perspective 
of embodiment. 
Based on these assumptions, anthropological debate has ques- 
tioned the concept of disease. M. Augé, in one of the most famous 
and profitable studies on contemporary medical anthropology, de- 
fines disease as “elemental form of the event”16. With this term he 
refers to all those biological individual events whose interpreta- 
tion, imposed by the cultural model, is immediately social. With 
this in mind, birth, death and disease are elementary events be- 
cause they are individual and collective at the same time. Disease 
is subject to the paradox of being both “the most individual and 
the most social events: 
 
The paradox is made up of the fact that disease is at the same time the most 
individual and the most social of events. Each of us experiences it on his or 
her own body and may die. Feeling it ominously grow within themselves, 
an individual can feel a sense of detachment from others in everything that 
constituted their previous social life. Yet, everything in it is at the same time 
social, not only because a number of institutions take charge of the various 
stages of its evolution, but also because the thought patterns that allow you 
to identify it, to give it a name and to cure it, are eminently social: thinking 
about your illness means already making reference to others17. 
Disease makes the link between individual perception and social symbolism 
explicit; this relationship needs to be explored in the intersection of its 
components, taking into account those that Augé says are the common 
foundations of the disease developed in all societies: 1) they speak of the 
individual (its definition, its components, its destiny, its accidents); 2)  
they speak of the society (the social causes of the disease, the threat they 
pose to the values and social situations structurally in terms of heritage, 
affiliation, affinity ...); 3) are based in part on observed facts: symptoms and 
circumstances of the illness18. 
328  
Silvia Iorio 
 
 
Disease, as a social aspect, is thought of as a representation, or as a 
production that refers not only to thoughts and words but also to be- 
haviour of a particular group19. The quest for meaning that this creates 
in the subject or person requires that he or she were to give an expla- 
nation built using different reference systems, which vary depending 
on the context in which the event of illness occurs. To build the chain 
of causation in which to classify the disease, the person then draws on 
the social meanings connected with it, showing its links with institu- 
tions that go well beyond those that are connected to medicine. 
Analysis of disease as an elementary event must take into account 
some factors that influence interpretation: the existence of a social 
order already thought out and defined, symbolized and set up prior 
to the event; the arbitrary nature of the event and the autonomy of 
the series of events in relation to the institutions that seek to under- 
stand and master them; as well as symbolic patterns underlying these 
interpretations. 
Health and disease are not so simple physiological states, but rather 
conceptual figures that respond to instances of definitions that are 
culturally and socially determined, and which vary according to the 
geographical and historical context in which they develop. The same 
diseased condition is not objectively given, rather it is a status result- 
ing from the explicit recognition by the community of a condition to 
which they give meanings commonly recognized by the community, 
and that the person lives with discomfort and malaise. The differ- 
ent diseases identified by medical science are not automatically per- 
ceived as such by those affected by the disease or the group to which 
it belongs. Ethnographic research has shown how the concepts of 
health and illness are not objective data that are mutually exclusive. 
On the contrary, there are categories whose boundaries fade ac- 
cording to historical time and geographical context, thus encroach- 
ing upon each biomedical definition. Health and disease processes 
are historical, cultural and socio-political concepts that try to enter 
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the real experience of the living body in an abstract representation, 
which responds to moments that are culturally defined and socially 
determined. They cannot be separated from the collective fields and 
the historical forces that actively intervene in their construction. 
In an attempt to restore the complexity of such concepts, the term 
“disease” has been questioned, in a thought process aimed at re- 
naming the phenomenon through the deconstruction of biomedical 
designations. The anthropology of the English language, especially 
the US, has adopted three terms to define three distinct dimensions 
of the disease: illness, disease, and sickness. The term illness can 
be translated in Italian with “malessere” and refers to the subjec- 
tive experience of disease, the state of suffering as perceived by the 
subject; disease translates in Italian with the word “infermità” and 
identifies the biomedical definition of disease, the pathological con- 
dition objectified as an alteration of the body according to signs and 
symptoms. On the other hand, sickness is translated as the “state of 
disease” that is socially recognized: “the social role of the patient 
formalized at the time of diagnosis”20. 
Through this breakdown, we are then able to highlight the semantic 
complexity of the concept of disease, while also revealing the con- 
tradictions inherent in a definition that is solely biomedical. There 
may be a disease without illness or, conversely, an illness without 
disease – these dimensions may be different, but even overlapping. 
From this tripartite division, anthropological approaches have creat- 
ed a thriving production – great importance must be given to current 
studies that focus specifically on the opposition of illness/disease. 
In this context, a major role has been that of scholars from Harvard 
University who have carried out a dialogical and interpretative 
study on the various narrative forms, which focuses on the subjec- 
tive perception of the experience of illness. This approach, known as 
meaning-centered, was introduced by Arthur Kleinman in the seven- 
ties, and Byron Good was known among its best-known exponents. 
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At the center of their work, there is the illness, which is expressed 
through these narratives, designed as “cultural tools that aim to re- 
construct the irregular experiences of illness in an order of mean- 
ing”21. The goal is to distance the disease from the definition given 
in biomedicine in order to highlight the cultural dimension inherent 
to it. Narratives are one of the tools available to the subject in order 
to meet the need for sense that the onset of disease creates – illness 
carries out a modification of the habitus and activates the need to 
represent the disease in a way that can be communicated – in order 
to define the experience in a meaningful order. This approach, while 
denaturalizing disease and highlighting the cultural dimension, also 
turned out in many ways to be a debasement. Narratives do not bring 
into play only the individual dimension of the illness, but there is a 
connected web of other dimensions, such as those related to social, 
economic and political relations, as well as the historical processes. 
The breakdown of terminology has been the subject of strong criti- 
cism by the French anthropologist Andras Zempléni22, who consid- 
ers this terminology subordinate to the notion of biomedical disease 
as a debasement – disease has a variety of aspects that are impossible 
to categorize in only three dimensions; doing so will also create the 
risk of not detecting the interaction between the three orders, those 
found in between, and many others. Important criticisms in the an- 
thropology of illness are found in the work of Ronald Frankenberg23 
and Allan Young24, who challenge the lack of consideration given 
to the processes of historical construction of biomedical categories 
of disease, the benefit of the exclusive attention individual experi- 
ence of the illness, in an approach that is essentially clinical. They 
therefore propose greater attention to processes of disease formation 
and the socio-political and historical causes on which categories of 
biomedical disease are built. On the other hand, importance must 
also be given to the sickness as a process of socialization of illness 
as well as disease. In this way, the medical anthropology of disease 
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and sickness is developed, through which the limited space of the 
doctor-patient relationship opens up to a more complex reality of 
relationships and each therapeutic act is to be considered as a power 
confrontation that is played out in the complex socio-political field 
of power relations25. 
Following the review of the tripartite division of the concept of dis- 
ease, two main theoretical currents were defined. On the one hand, 
the meaning-centered approach, whose members, once again A. 
Kleinman and B.J. Good, propose an observation of disease as a 
cultural construction of meaning, through the adoption of a herme- 
neutic perspective. This thesis is based on the concept of explana- 
tory models, which Kleinman calls “belief patterns that contain ex- 
planations of some or each of these five questions: etiology, early 
symptoms, pathophysiology, course of the disease (severity and type 
of role of the sick person), and therapy”26. This concept refers to     
a set of terms used by those involved in the therapeutic process - 
patients, doctors, family members – to reconstruct the causes and 
meaning of an episode of illness and develop useful knowledge for 
the therapeutic action. We are dealing with models of knowhow and 
understanding that are set up in models of explanations, able to re- 
construct the meaning and causes of the disease and that belong to 
both the patient and the doctor. The explanatory model of the pa- 
tient and their family is founded on informal knowledge about the 
disease, in relation to strong emotions that guide those choices re- 
garding the therapeutic route to take. The biomedical explanatory 
model, however, is based on the disease and combines knowledge 
acquired during training with those resulting from the therapeutic 
practice. The clinical reality of the care relationship is established 
through negotiation of explanatory models that are individual, fam- 
ily, professional or “traditional”, all involved in relationship among 
the therapist-patient-family, making the transaction a therapeutic 
phenomenon of hermeneutic nature. According to anthropologists 
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of the Harvard School, conflicts in medical communication would 
be the leading cause of non-compliance and therefore of therapeutic 
inefficacy. Biomedicine should deal with curing ailments and not 
reprocessing experiences, therefore avoiding the need for patients to 
give meaning to their experience. 
The “explanatory model” is to be found in a “semantic networks 
illness”, a concept introduced in 1977 by B. J. Good during ethno- 
graphic research on epilepsy in Iran. This term indicates: 
 
A “syndrome” of specific experiences, a set of words, situations and fee- 
lings that typically “contribute” to the members of a society, those sym- 
ptoms and emotions through which the sufferer gives meaning to their dise- 
ase. This syndrome is not only a reflection of symptoms linked in natural 
reality, but a set of experiences associated through networks of meaning 
and social interactions within a society27. 
 
Good believes that only a semantic network can investigate the 
meaning of the categories of the disease – research should therefore 
focus on the words, emotions and all aspects of social interaction 
used to express forms of experience related to the illness. Networks 
of meaning that connect the experience of illness to the cultural val- 
ues of a specific social context appear structured around a symbolic 
element; “heartache” in Iran is the central symbol around which nar- 
ratives are constructed about several incidents to illness in women, 
such as childbirth, pregnancy, abortion, contamination, menstrua- 
tion, oral contraception, and sterility. The concept of a semantic net- 
work takes into account the emotional and experiential elements that 
give meaning to a particular episode of illness and condenses the 
set of personal, social and cultural meanings that aggregate around 
suffering. 
The second school of thought, developed from the critical review  
of the concepts of disease, illness, and sickness, adopts a perspec- 
tive of analysis that aims to track, within the categories and the cul- 
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tural meanings of the disease, frameworks and structures of domain 
and power. The vast array of political, social, and economic powers 
that come into play in a given context, become the object of an- 
thropological research, therefore outlining the shift from a “cultural- 
ist” approach to illness, focused on doctor-patient relationship, to a 
social-political approach towards the understanding of disease and 
sickness. G. Pizza summarizes this approach as follows: 
 
Every therapeutic act is always a confrontation of powers, which is pla- 
yed in a more complex field of socio-political power relations. The doctor- 
patient relationship is always stuck in a field of relationships that is wider 
and broader. Just think, for example, of how that relationship is in fact 
crossed by external logic to the dyadic relationship, reflecting the dialectic 
hegemonic socio-political space – in relation to health policies and insti- 
tutional activities of the State and in relation to families and others social 
subjects, depending on the situations and contexts28. 
 
This theoretical approach, in direct opposition to that of Harvard, 
has created a thriving literary production; for reasons of relevance to 
the issues treated by the author of this study, I will simply mention 
the anthropological production that, even within the same theoretical 
current, has taken on the concept of “social suffering” as a specific 
subject of research. This is a concept that aims to investigate the 
relationship between the historical and social processes and expe- 
riences of discomfort, revealing how disease represents one of the 
ways in which social suffering arises. 
 
Social suffering [...] includes a common set of human problems whose origin 
and whose consequences sink their roots into the devastating fractures that 
social forces can exert on human experience. Social suffering  is the result  
of what the political, economic and institutional powers do to people, and, 
reciprocally, how these forms of power may themselves influence responses to 
social problems. Included in the category of social suffering, there are con- 
ditions that generally refer to different fields, conditions that simultaneously 
involve issues of health, welfare, but also legal, moral and religious aspects29. 
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This perspective focuses on the relationship between the subject and 
the social order, and the ways in which some forms of power may be 
involved in producing discomfort. Human suffering is a social fact, 
which deserves to be investigated as a result of the actions of the 
political, economic and institutional power. In this sense, the task of 
anthropology of social suffering is to understand the pathogenic role 
of this authority, which is equivalent to the assumption of a politi- 
cal commitment to promote social equity and, where necessary, to 
denounce human rights violations. It is not limited, in fact, to the 
analysis of cultural representations, and appears to be highly critical 
of those forms of relativism that tend to conceal social inequality. 
One of the most significant contributions on these themes is that of 
Paul Farmer, a proponent of a theoretical view that suggests con- 
sidering, as an object of anthropological study, the embodiment of 
historical, social and political processes in individual biographies, 
through in-depth historical and geographical. Considering the case 
of AIDS and tuberculosis in Haiti, he highlights how social forces of 
various kinds can produce what he calls “structural violence”. This 
expression refers to Farmer “iatrogenic effects produced by a social 
order characterized by deep inequalities”30; a particular type of vio- 
lence that is exerted in an indirect way, since it does not require a 
person to be performed, but rather it is produced within the same so- 
cial order and by the inequalities that are produced within its interior. 
 
The term is particularly appropriate since this suffering is “structured” 
by forces and processes created through history (often economically dri- 
ven) that conspire - through routine, ritual or, as more often happens, the 
harshness of life - limiting the ability to take action31. 
 
This is “structured and structuring”, because not only is it inherent in 
the social makeup, but it also limits the capacity for action of those 
who occupy more marginal positions within contexts marked by 
deep social inequalities. In Haiti, AIDS and tuberculosis, and with 
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them racial, political violence and gender inequality, are considered 
various ways in which social suffering materializes in people’s lives, 
as individual embodiment of wider social, historical and political 
processes. Farmer raises the question as follows: “Through what so- 
cial forces, ranging from poverty to racism, are to be embodied as 
individual experience?”32; we need to understand how to hold to- 
gether the individual experience of suffering with social forces and 
processes of large-scale in which cultural forms and social forces are 
involved. For the analysis of “structural violence”, Farmer suggests 
considering three fundamental “axes of suffering”: 
 
Social factors including gender, ethnicity (“race”), and socioeconomic sta- 
tus may each play a role in rendering individuals and groups vulnerable 
to extreme human suffering. But in most settings these factors by themsel- 
ves have limited explanatory power. Rather, simultaneous consideration  
of various social “axes” is imperative in efforts to discern a political eco- 
nomy of brutality33. 
 
“The axis of gender” helps us understand why two people with the 
same status may fall victim to violence different; being a woman, 
in fact, often means suffering a subordinate relationship that hits 
directly in the intimacy of domestic life. In Haiti, the majority of 
women who die of AIDS, in fact, lived in a state of deep poverty. 
“The axis of the race” or ethnicity offers the opportunity to reveal 
how the definition of the differences in racial and ethnic manages to 
conceal the problem of economic and social inequality. The concept 
of “race” and that of “ethnicity” are often used to deprive the funda- 
mental rights specific social groups – their use as explanatory criteria 
of suffering hides social inequalities “biologizing” or “ethnicizing” 
them, covering the fact that they are consequences of an unequal 
distribution of resources. 
The axis that sees the combination of structural violence and “cul- 
tural difference”, in conclusion, must be considered in order to cri- 
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tique that anthropological view that has confused, through a nar- 
row relativist approach, social inequality with cultural differences. 
Approaches based on a concept of culture as an “essence” that men 
seem to have, has today led to a “culturalization” of suffering. Issues 
related to the management of power and institutional structures were 
frequently raised as an issue of alleged cultural changes in local 
contexts, to the detriment of the analysis of the structural elements 
affecting real balance of power. These axes of oppression must be 
considered as a simultaneous act, since there are factors that, if con- 
sidered individually, may be decisive. 
Only the concomitant action of social forces with varying nature is able 
to frame and give structure to the daily risk of exposure to certain dis- 
eases. In most situations, gender in itself is not enough to create a risk 
for this type of aggression to the dignity of the person. Poor women, in 
fact, are the most defenceless against these attacks. This applies not only 
to domestic violence and rape, but also to AIDS and its distribution34. 
These are issues that call into question the statistical and epidemi- 
ological parameters that currently govern health policies and hu- 
manitarian intervention, in areas where the suffering is related to a 
condition of structural violence, inherently positioned in the global 
economic and policies from which they are derived. 
The complex traits of suffering can only be grasped through the per- 
sonal stories and biographies. What the victims, past and present, 
share are neither, in fact, attributes of a personal or psychological 
character, nor can the common experience of suffering be gener- 
ally attributed to culture, language or race. What the victims share 
is rather the experience of occupying the lowest point on the social 
ladder in inegalitarian society. Therefore, ethnographic work must 
come from biographies, which are located within the historical and 
social systems in which they develop. Farmer shows that the same 
mechanisms that create inequalities to restrict the ability of individ- 
ual action in life choices, so they are crucial for understanding what 
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he calls “pathologies of power”35. Ethnography in disease experience 
is aimed at showing how the relationship between history, power and 
processes of embodiment are inscribed directly into the body, which 
becomes not only a place of organ dysfunction, but a reflection of a 
social order characterized and defined by deep inequalities. 
Within this theoretical perspective, there are many works that wel- 
come the concept of Foucauldian bio-politics36. Dissertations of the 
French philosopher around this concept have, in fact, been widely re- 
ported, and were accepted within the anthropological debate by virtue 
of their ability to question the relationship between power and bio- 
logical life. According to Foucault, since the eighteenth century, we 
have been witnessing a radical transformation of the relationship of 
power with life and death. Up to the age of the Enlightenment, in fact, 
the sovereign power was the holder of the right to take life or let live, 
a right not absolute but relative to the defence and survival of the sov- 
ereign state. Sovereign power is exercised, therefore, as withdrawal, 
such as the right to take life. The eighteenth century, however, led to 
a major transformation: political power takes on the task of “manag- 
ing life”; it transforms human life and enters the field of explicit cal- 
culations, for whom death is no longer the instrument with the most 
important domain, but rather the limit to continuously remove. 
 
One might say that the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a 
power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death. This is perhaps what 
explains that disqualification of death, which marks the recent wane of the 
rituals that accompanied it. That death is so carefully evaded is linked less 
to a new anxiety that makes death unbearable for our societies than to the 
fact that the procedures of power have not ceased to turn away from death. 
In the passage from this world to the other, death was the manner in which 
a terrestrial sovereignty was relieved by another, singularly more powerful 
sovereignty; the pageantry that surrounded it was in the category of poli- 
tical ceremony. Now it is over life, throughout its unfolding, that power 
establishes its dominion; death is power’s limit, the moment that escapes 
it; death becomes the most secret aspect of existence, the most “private”37. 
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What Foucault calls bio-power does not eliminate sovereignty, but 
rather penetrates and carries out life management through specific 
techniques. Between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, bio- 
power is developed in two main forms: the first has the body as its 
objective, the reinforcement of attitudes, the growth of its value in 
relation to the needs of the structures in which it stands. It is a dis- 
cipline that Foucault calls “political anatomy of the human body”38. 
The second is the “Bio-politics of the population” and takes place in 
a series of regulatory controls related to demographic phenomena, 
birth and mortality, levels of health or lifespan; a term which refers 
to the way in which we have tried to rationalize the problems posed 
to governmental practice by specific phenomena of its population. 
These two forms of power over life in the eighteenth century still ap- 
pear separate, but are an articulation in the nineteenth century, when 
for the first time the biological reality begins to be reflected in this 
policy, and the fact of life is no longer the inaccessible base that 
emerges only sporadically in the events of the death and fatality. It 
passes, at least in part, into the field of knowledge control and inter- 
vention of power. 
In relation to this process of articulation, Foucault highlights the 
important role of the state, defined as a form of power that is also   
a power of collectivizing and individualizing. In the modern state, 
the body and bio-politics of the population tend to be articulated in 
particular ways. This can be achieved because it is able to integrate 
into a new political form and that of a power technique: that which 
is pastoral. Already present in Eastern societies, and introduced to 
Europe by Christianity, this power has certain characteristics. It rules 
over a multitude of people and not a territory; it guides the individual 
during the course of his or her life to ensure his safety; unlike the 
royal power the person must be able to sacrifice for their flocks; it is 
a form of power that can be exercised only by knowing the feelings 
of men, urging them to reveal their deepest secrets. Pastoral power 
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is not limited to compel the individual to perform certain tasks, but 
seeks to determine the relationship they have with themselves. The 
modern state must be considered a new form of pastoral power; it is 
an attempt to meld the political power exercised on the “legal enti- 
ties” with the pastoral power exercised on living individuals. The 
art of governing therefore moves from the scope of the Christian 
pastoral power to that of civil society; it no longer guarantees the sal- 
vation in the hereafter but rather guarantees it in this world: health, 
hygiene, birth rates, longevity, well-being, and security are taken 
over by this new power. Bio-power has been one of the elements es- 
sential to the development of capitalism, which could not have been 
achieved without the inclusion of bodies in the apparatus of produc- 
tion and without an adaptation of the phenomena of population to 
these economic processes. 
This new pastoral power is exercised by public institutions, the fam- 
ily, and complex structures, such as medicine. The first pole in which 
bio-power is made up of the disciplinary techniques, which allow for 
the detailed management of the population through direct interven- 
tion on individuals and aims to make them “docile”. The other pole 
is that of bio-politics of the population, which indicates the ways in 
which they have tried, since the eighteenth century, to rationalize 
the problems posed by the population to governmental practice. The 
procedures for standardization to regulate subjects invade more and 
more the scope of the law.  The norm applies, in fact, to the body  
of individuals with regard to the population, creating a “society of 
normalization”. This expression means not a generalized disciplin- 
ary society, but rather a society in which norms of discipline and 
the norm of regulation both interact. An emblematic case is found 
in medicine, which since the nineteenth century has acted a great 
deal on bodies as well as on the population. In Birth of the Clinic, 
Foucault highlights the establishment of a process of “medicaliza- 
tion” of society, through which the doctor’s view enters social space 
340  
Silvia Iorio 
 
 
in order not only to cure diseases, but also to identify and provide 
specified health parameters. In this manner, the clinic assumes a role 
of legislation and norms. 
Bio-power affects bodies and the population, also acting in areas 
outside of disease – this is even more evident if we look at sexuality. 
 
With this background, we can understand the importance of sex as a subject 
of political struggle [...] On one hand, sex participates in the disciplines 
of the body [...] while on the other it participates in the regulation of all 
peoples through the global effects that it induces. It fits simultaneously   
on two registers; it gives rise to infinitesimal surveillance, constant con- 
trol, as well as organization of the space of an extreme meticulousness, a 
medical or interminable psychological examination, and an entire micro- 
power over the body; but also gives rise to massive measures, to statistical 
estimates, with interventions that target the entire body or social groups 
as a whole39. 
 
Sexuality allows bio-power to reach and affect life, providing access 
to the life of the body and that of the species. Sexuality is related  
to power strategies, and it is the set of the effects produced in bod- 
ies, behaviours and social relations from a specific device that is de- 
pendent on complex political technology. Sexuality is so disciplined, 
pursued in our existence, and at the same time becomes the theme of 
political operations, economic interventions (such as incitement or 
brakes on procreation) and ideological campaigns of moralization or 
empowerment. 
If Foucault, through the concept of bio-power, clarifies the relation- 
ship between politics and health, identifying a particular historical 
break that occurred in the West in the age of Enlightenment, Didier 
Fassin, while accepting to address the concept of bio-politics, de- 
velops a thesis that exceeds that specification and considers the geo- 
graphical and temporal power in local forms in which it works. 
In his famous work L’Espace Politique de la Santé40, he provides us 
with a new definition of health, which takes on a double meaning: 
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Health therefore appears simultaneously as a concept and as a space defi- 
ned by the relationship between the physical and the social body. [...] A 
notion where we find meanings developed both by common sense and by 
the learned knowledge. This is a space that connects an ensemble of agents 
that meet there as patients, professionals and administrators41. 
 
Health insofar as a “notion” comes forth as a cultural creation, in 
which common sense and official knowledge interact – health as a 
political construction, on the other hand, describes a space in which 
the action unfolds in a multiplicity of social protagonists who vie 
for the meaning and definition of the aforesaid “notion”. Conceiving 
health as a political space offers the opportunity to reveal those power 
relations inherent to the processes of health and disease, freeing them 
from a description that conceives them as natural and objective real- 
ity. Therefore, we can investigate the links between “official knowl- 
edge”, represented by the powers of the state, and “common sense”. 
It is at this point that a space opens up for interaction with the analysis 
of processes of embodiment, which aims to highlight the link be- 
tween physical well-being and social, historical, and political forces. 
Much like Farmer, the French anthropologist sees disease not as an 
objective reality inscribed in the body, but rather as a social reality 
from which power relations emerge. Social order is mirrored, in fact, 
in the body, which can become an expression of the unequal distribu- 
tion of resources of care and, consequently, the different possibilities 
of surviving the disease or not. The analysis of the relationship be- 
tween physical well-being and state policies shows that health may be 
included as the possibility of access to tangible and intangible resourc- 
es that ensure high levels of life satisfaction; the disease can be, on the 
contrary, the impossibility of access to these resources, and therefore 
a form of embodiment of inequality. According to this perspective, 
health is set up as a social and political problem, and the difficulty of 
access to resources and services that protect people become an ex- 
pression of social injustice that characterize a given context. Social 
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inequality produces disparities, and differences in status or wealth can 
be inscribed to bodies, turning social aspects into biological issues. 
Within the political world of health and health care, a set of powers 
takes action. The powers are involved in the political management 
of bodies: “public health”, understood as collective health manage- 
ment governed by the state, to raise the issue of the possibility of 
access to resources that guarantee wellness. It is therefore a place of 
interaction of a set of powers that play a central role in the definition 
of the concept of health and ensuring, or not, access to resources that 
ensure the well-being. The state plays in this respect, a key role. The 
state is responsible for the collective management of disease: 
 
The role of the state and therefore central: as the monopoly of legitimate 
violence and founder of social protection systems, in terms of the embo- 
diment of inequality; as the supreme example of legitimization of actors 
and arbitration of conflicts regarding the power to heal; as defender of the 
public good and guarantor of public order, with regard to governing lives42. 
 
Violence informs the aforesaid state policies and through them these 
bodies are inscribed. An exemplary case is found in French policies 
on immigrants without residence permits; regulatory policies adopted 
by European states for access to territories of illegal aliens has been 
delayed by issues regarding the right of asylum as well as the right for 
care – following amendments to legislation, all possibilities of obtain- 
ing a residence permit have been limited, while health and disease have 
become progressively more useful for obtaining legal status. If citi- 
zenship is the basis in order to claim certain rights, illegal immigrants 
cannot be considered holders of such rights; only in cases where there 
is a clear threat to the biological existence of immigrants will the immi- 
grant be granted the right to enter or remain in France without papers. 
 
The legitimacy of the suffering body, offered in the name of a common 
humanity is opposed to the illegitimacy of the racialized body, promulgated 
in the name of an insurmountable difference. [...] The body has become the 
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site of inscription for politics of immigration, defining what we can call, 
using Foucauldian terminology, a bio-politics of otherness43. 
 
“Bio-politics of Otherness” must be understood as the extreme re- 
duction of social to biological systems. The suffering body has im- 
posed its legitimacy whereby there were no other bases that would 
guarantee legal status; this became the place of last political legiti- 
macy: only as that “bare life” illegal aliens receive as recognition. 
Violence lies not only in the countries from which they are forced 
to flee, but also in the hospitality and immigration policies and prac- 
tices of the host countries. 
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